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Productivity growth and price regulation of Slovenian water distribution utilities 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper aims to analyse the price regulation method and performance of the water industry 
in Slovenia. A stochastic cost frontier model is employed to estimate and decompose the total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth of water distribution utilities in the 1997-2003 period. The 
main goal is to find out whether the lack of proper incentives to improve performance has 
resulted in the low TFP growth of Slovenian water distribution utilities. The evidence 
suggests that cost inefficiencies are present in water utilities, which indicates considerable 
cost saving potential in the analysed industry. Technical change is found to have positively 
affected the TFP growth over time, while cost inefficiency levels remained essentially 
unchanged. Overall, the average annual TFP growth in the analysed period is estimated to be 
only slightly above zero, which is a relatively poor result. This can largely be contributed to 
the present institutional and regulatory setting that does not stimulate utilities to improve 
productivity. Therefore, the introduction of an independent regulatory agency and an 
incentive-based price regulation scheme should be seriously considered in order to enhance 
the performance of Slovenian water distribution utilities.  
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Keywords: TFP growth, SFA, cost efficiency, water distribution utilities, price regulation  
 
 
 1
1. Introduction 
 
Measures of productivity and associated productivity growth are of great interest when 
analysing firm, sector or country performance. Measures that simultaneously take all factors 
of production into account are usually preferred over single or partial factor productivity 
measures. Total factor productivity (TFP) is an overall measure of productivity and is 
typically computed using an index number approach as the ratio between an output index and 
an input index. TFP growth is one of the most widely employed measures of overall 
productivity change. As productivity growth also plays an important role in incentive-based 
price regulation, regulatory authorities may be interested in measuring TFP growth. This 
information can be then used in the price regulation process to set requirements for improving 
utilities’ performance.  
 
Since the late 1980s it has become increasingly important to promote the performance of 
natural monopolies operating within network industries. In this respect, incentive-based 
regulation schemes appear to be superior to the traditional rate-of-return regulation. The most 
widely adopted incentive-based regulatory schemes involve price cap (RPI-X or CPI-X 
regulation)1, revenue cap, and yardstick regulation models. The X factor reflects the cost 
reduction required by regulators and assures that productivity improvements are passed on 
and that existing above-normal profits and cost inefficiencies are removed. It assures that 
customers receive some price benefits as a result of price-cap regulation and that management 
will have to achieve some target level of efficiency improvement before stakeholders benefit 
from enhanced profits as a result of lower costs.  
 
The individual X-factor is usually based on two pieces of information: the rate of productivity 
growth (technical change) reported in the industry in recent years and the firm’s cost 
inefficiency, i.e. on the extent that a given firm is operating below the best practice in the 
industry (Coelli et al., 2003). The greater the X, the tighter is the constraint. In order to set 
efficiency or productivity requirements, most regulation schemes employ benchmarking. In 
this way, the informational asymmetry problem between the regulator and firms can be 
overcome. In benchmarking applications the regulator is generally interested in obtaining a 
measure of a firm’s performance relative to a predefined benchmark in order to reward (or 
punish) a firm accordingly. For example, benchmarking combined with a price cap is in use in 
the UK water and sewerage sector (OFWAT, 1999, 2004). 
 
In Slovenia, the current price regulation of water distribution utilities resembles the traditional 
rate-of-return regulation. In the past this was combined with very restrictive limits on the 
maximum price increases allowed in order to curtail inflationary pressures. In 2004, the use of 
benchmarking in the price regulation of water utilities was considered but has never been 
implemented due to a lack of data and concerns regarding its quality. 
 
In this paper, we consider the possibility of employing stochastic frontier benchmarking 
methods to analyse the performance of water distribution utilities operating in Slovenia. 
Stochastic frontier approach is used to estimate the cost frontier function for a sample of 
water distribution utilities operating between 1997 and 2003. The main objective of this paper 
is to obtain estimates of the TFP growth of Slovenian water distribution utilities and evaluate 
the outcome of the regulatory regime with respect to promoting productivity growth in the 
Slovenian water sector. The underlying hypothesis is that the lack of proper incentives to 
                                                 
1 RPI and CPI denote retail and consumer price index, respectively. 
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improve performance has resulted in the low TFP growth of Slovenian water distribution 
utilities. We draw on work by Filippini et al. (2008) where different stochastic frontier 
methods are employed to estimate the cost inefficiencies of Slovenian water utilities. While 
the emphasis in Filippini et al. (2008) is on comparing alternative econometric models for 
estimating cost efficiency using panel data, this paper extends the analysis to the measurement 
of productivity growth, which is a broader concept than efficiency improvement. Indeed, we 
use the same data set and one of the econometric models used in Filippini et al. (2008) to 
perform a productivity analysis and to decompose the TFP growth into its constituent parts. 
The goal is to identify which components, if any, made the most significant contribution to 
the TFP growth in Slovenian water distribution utilities.  
 
In the academic literature we can find three types of studies on the costs of water distribution 
companies: (i) studies estimating economies of density, economies of scale and/or economies 
of scope; (ii) studies estimating cost efficiency; and (iii) studies estimating TFP growth. Most 
studies investigate economies of scale in the water supply industry2, while only a few studies 
on cost efficiency can be found, namely in Bhattacharyya et al. (1995), Ashton (2000) and 
Filippini et al. (2008). Likewise, the issue of productivity growth in the water industry has 
been neglected in the academic literature. The only exception is the work by Saal and Parker 
(2001) and Saal et al. (2007) which were motivated by the privatisation of the English and 
Welsh water and sewerage industry in 1989. The two studies analysed productivity growth in 
order to assess improvements in the industry’s performance under private ownership and to 
obtain productivity estimates that could be used in price regulation. Surprisingly, the results 
show that productivity growth did not improve after privatisation. Further, the decomposition 
of the TFP growth in Saal et al. (2007) indicates that technical change increased after 
privatisation, while the efficiency change and scale effects were negative. The latter implies 
the presence of decreasing returns to scale in the water and sewerage sector. 
 
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional 
setting, major changes and issues along with the current regulatory scheme of the Slovenian 
water sector. Section 3 presents the model specification employed and the methodology to 
decompose TFP growth. This is followed by Section 4 where a data description is briefly 
provided. Finally, Section 5 presents the estimation results and discusses the main findings, 
while Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Institutional setting and price regulation of the Slovenian water industry 
 
In Slovenia communal services, i.e. services related to water supply, wastewater treatment 
and solid waste collection and disposal, are generally managed at the local community level. 
They are classified as obligatory local public services since municipalities or local 
communities are obliged to provide these services. Public utilities have the exclusive right to 
provide public services in the territory of one or more local communities, which makes them 
local monopolists. Networks that are needed to provide communal services typically 
demonstrate significant economies of scale. Due to the natural monopoly characteristics of 
communal services introduction of competition is not feasible since new entries would only 
lead to duplication of fixed costs (Baldwin, Cave, 1999). Therefore, these activities need to be 
regulated. In Slovenia, local communities are in charge of controlling the quality of services 
                                                 
2 Relevant papers estimating economies of density, scale and/or scope in water supply companies are the 
following: Kim and Clark (1988), Bhattacharyya et al. (1995), Ashton (2000), Fabbri and Fraquelli (2000), 
Antonioli and Filippini (2001), Mizutani and Urakami (2001), Garcia and Thomas (2001), and Filippini et al. 
(2008). 
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and the prices charged. Communal services are generally provided by public enterprises, but 
they can also be delegated to private entities through concessions. Usually, in smaller 
municipalities all communal services are joined within a single company, i.e. “multi-utility”, 
while in larger municipalities communal services are provided separately by several 
companies.  
 
The post-1991 period has witnessed dramatic changes in the legal environment and 
institutional framework in which local communities and their respective communal utilities 
operate. These changes can be classified in two main groups: changes in the relationship 
between local communities and public utilities and changes in local communities’ legislation. 
Both have had unfavourable impacts on the level of communal infrastructure investments 
(Mrak, 1997). 
 
Under the 1993 Public Utilities Act, the ownership of communal infrastructure was 
transferred to local communities. They became owners of assets that were previously in the 
possession of public utilities. Accordingly, local communities as the new owners of 
communal infrastructure became responsible for the investments required to maintain and 
upgrade communal infrastructure. As there were no precise accounting standards for the 
effective implementation of legislation, the depreciation of communal infrastructure was often 
not accounted for. This jeopardised the long-term financial viability of communal utilities 
(Mrak, 1997). The solution came in 1997 with the adoption of a special accounting standard 
(SRS 35) to deal with accounting issues specific to the public sector. 
 
Another development that hindered investments in communal infrastructure was the 
reorganisation of local communities. Under the 1993 Law on Local Self-Government the 
large majority of local communities was divided into two or more local communities. 
Between 1991 and 2008 the number of local communities in Slovenia more than tripled, from 
62 municipalities in 1991 to 210 in 2008 (SORS, 2008). As the reorganised local communities 
were often very small, many did not have sufficient financial resources to invest in communal 
infrastructure. The issue of infrastructural investment was further complicated by the fact that 
a distribution of assets and liabilities of old local communities among the new ones had to be 
established. Some public utilities also faced the situation where they operated in more than 
one local community which exposed them to various problems as they had to deal with more 
than one owner of communal infrastructure, requiring a consensus on pricing and other 
operational issues (Mrak, 1997). 
 
Besides these investment problems, the poor financial performance of communal utilities was 
another issue. Prices of communal services have been under government control since 1992. 
Price determination was subject to political considerations and other macroeconomic goals 
(e.g. reducing inflation), which caused the prices of communal services to rise slower than the 
inflation rate (i.e., a decrease in real terms). In this way utilities were not allowed to increase 
their prices to the full-cost levels (Štruc, 1997). In most cases, tariffs have only been sufficient 
to cover current expenditures but not to finance regular maintenance and the replacement of 
fixed assets (Hrovatin, 2002). Consequently, the financial soundness of communal utilities 
was well below the financial performance of the Slovenian economy as a whole. In fact, most 
communal utilities operated at a loss, which is highly unsustainable in the long run. Kavčič 
(2000) reported that in 1998 the average costs were on average 30 percent higher than the 
average price of water supplied to different customer groups. 
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In order to improve their poor financial position caused by the restrictive price regulation, 
communal utilities had to find ‘creative’ solutions regarding new funding sources. One of the 
most commonly used practices over the examined period was the introduction of 
environmental and/or local fees. In this way local communities tried to help their utilities 
overcome the most severe financial constraints on doing business.  
 
Another interesting issue was, and still is, the striking differences in water prices across local 
communities. This arose from the fact that public utilities had very different price levels at the 
start of the price control. Some utilities charged prices close to the full-cost level, while in 
others prices were well below costs. Hence, the price control created different operating 
environments for utilities with different starting positions. Unfortunately, this issue was not 
recognised by the relevant authorities (Hrovatin, 2002). 
 
As in many transition economies, Slovenia also faced significant differences in price levels 
for water supply between different customer groups. Prices for water supply were the lowest 
for households and the highest for businesses customers. Nevertheless, the range of prices 
paid by different customer groups has narrowed over time (Štruc, 1997). Although price 
discrimination between different groups of customers may sometimes be justified by 
differences in costs, the policy of subsidising households and thereby addressing social policy 
issues seems to be a more plausible explanation. Such social policy causes distorting effects 
of low-priced services. It enhances overconsumption and reduces incentives for efficiency 
since customers receive misleading signals as to the real value of services. 
 
In 2004, there was a serious attempt to change the price setting practice whereby the primary 
objective of reducing inflation was to be replaced by improving the performance of public 
utilities. The government issued the Rules on the Price Determination of Obligatory Local 
Public Utilities (2004) with an attempt to introduce benchmarking methods in the regulatory 
scheme. In this way, utilities would have been given proper incentives for more efficient 
operation. This would have resembled the UK regulation practice for water and sewerage 
industry (OFWAT, 2004). 3  Soon after the Rules were adopted, it was realised that this 
objective was too ambitious for the time being due to the lack of appropriate and reliable data. 
Data have not been systematically collected at the national level as water utilities are under 
the responsibility of local communities and no regulatory agency was established at the 
national level. Also, an agreement on the benchmarking methodology was not reached. 
Therefore, the Rules never came into effect. 
 
With minor changes each year, a very restrictive price-setting policy based on decrees on the 
price determination of communal services was in place until August 2009 when the Decree 
repealing the Decree on the Formation of Prices for Basic Utility Services (2009) was issued. 
At present, the price regulation of Slovenian water distribution utilities resembles the 
traditional rate-of-return regulation. According to the Rules of the Tariff System for 
Obligatory Local Public Utility Services (2009) price control by the government has been 
abandoned which means that price-setting became the sole responsibility of respective local 
communities. Cost-reflective prices have been introduced, while there are no incentives for 
efficiency improvements. According to the IMAD (2009), the transfer of pricing 
responsibilities to local communities in the absence of an appropriate pricing methodology 
and independent regulatory body is expected to lead to greater inefficiencies which will 
                                                 
3 The EU Water Pricing Communication (COM(2000) 477 final) also facilitates benchmarking. Benchmarking 
of suppliers’ performance is viewed as an incentive to improve their efficiency and quality of services and 
reduce their costs and prices. 
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eventually be translated into price increases. This also raises concerns regarding the 
competence and independence of political considerations in the governance of utilities. Local 
communities do not have sufficient and skilled professional staff to stimulate the efficient 
operation of water utilities and set up adequate price regulation schemes. Moreover, populism 
and other political goals may jeopardise the viability of communal utilities.  
 
Decision-making with respect to water prices varies considerably between and within the EU 
member states. While water-price levels and structures can be decided at the local, regional or 
national level, it is rare that decisions on pricing are entirely decentralised with no supervisory 
power institutionalised at the national level. Municipal decision-making will inevitably lead to 
a greater diversity of pricing practices within a given country than centralised decisions by 
government ministries. Also, independent regulatory authorities may have different 
perspectives on price setting than respective ministries, the former being perhaps more 
professional and technical in their approach and the latter being more political and 
bureaucratic. Moreover, in the EU context there are currently considerable differences in 
organisation of water supply between the member states. Forms of organisation include 
provision of water by municipalities, private companies and quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organisations, with varying degree of regulation by government departments, 
federal states, local communities, and independent regulatory bodies. As a result, there are 
wide variations between member states in relative price levels, structure of prices, costs, 
levels of cost recovery, investment levels, and water quality (Hrovatin and Bailey, 2001).  
 
To address these issues, the European Commission (EC) published the EU Water Pricing 
Communication (COM(2000) 477 final) with recommendations for water pricing policies in 
the EU member states. The EC advocates an increased role for pricing in enhancing the 
sustainability of water resources. Efficient water pricing is believed to act as an incentive to 
reduce pollution and improve the efficiency of water use. The water prices should be set at the 
full-cost levels and in direct relation to the water consumed or pollution produced. This would 
additionally mobilise financial resources to ensure the financial sustainability of water 
infrastructure and service suppliers. Therefore, the EC recommends a harmonised approach to 
water pricing across the EU, using volumetric charges to reflect and recover financial, 
environmental and resource costs. 4  The EC also calls for the standardised accountancy 
practices and the adoption of common definitions for key cost variables which would 
facilitate the comparison between costs and prices, and benchmarking analysis. The EC 
recommendations are expected to have significant implications for the EU member states. 
However, due to the extremely diverse arrangements in the water supply between the EU 
member states, so far there has been a rather slow progress towards the harmonised EU water 
policy. 
 
Clearly, the strategic objective of the communal sector in Slovenia should be to move towards 
the reliable and cost-efficient provision of communal services which will also take account of 
safety of the population and protection of the environment and be in compliance with the 
relevant EU legislation. In order to achieve these objectives, a range of co-ordinated policy 
measures has to be designed and put into operation. The following core elements of the 
communal sector reform consistent with the EU’s water pricing policy recommendations can 
be identified (Mrak, 2000): 
                                                 
4 To be noted that the harmonised approach is not expected to result in uniform prices due to the differences in 
costs reflecting geographical, topographical, climate, institutional and economic factors, which vary considerably 
not only between but also within countries.  
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• the introduction of cost-reflective prices of communal infrastructure services and tariff 
reform; 
• the introduction of competition for the market, restructuring of service providers and 
private sector involvement; 
• a legal and institutional framework which would provide clear rules for private sector 
involvement in communal infrastructure investment and in the provision of communal 
services; and 
• a regulatory framework: independent yet accountable regulatory authorities are needed to 
monitor the operation and performance of utilities. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Model specification 
 
The main purpose of water supply utilities is to produce drinking water with sufficient quality 
from a resource (groundwater or surface water) that may require preliminary treatments to 
make drinking water wholesome and clean, and to distribute water by continuously adapting 
supply to daily demand while preserving water quality during its transportation through the 
transmission and distribution network (Garcia and Thomas, 2001). Water supply utilities 
typically cover all operations from resource extraction to consumer taps. The costs of 
operating a water distribution system are therefore the costs of building and maintaining the 
water system (wells and springs, pumps, treatment facilities, storage facilities, transmission 
and distribution pipelines and other facilities), and of measuring and billing water. The main 
factors influencing the cost of water distribution companies consist of total water sold, input 
prices, total number of customers served, type of consumers and customer density, size and 
morphology of the distribution area, length of distribution pipes, water resource (underground 
water or surface water), water losses from the distribution system, and water treatment needed 
(Antonioli and Filippini, 2001). 
 
For the specification of the cost model, we consider a water distribution company which uses 
three inputs, labour, capital and material, to distribute a single output to a number of 
customers within its service area. Therefore, the cost function can be written as: 
 
),,,,,,,( tWUASCUQPPPCC KML= ,      (1) 
 
where C represents total cost and PL, PM, and PK are the price of labour, the price of material 
and the price of capital, respectively. Q is the output represented by the quantity of water 
delivered, CU stands for the number of customers served, while AS is the size of the service 
area. The reason for including these two variables in the model is that in the case of network 
industries the output typically possesses several dimensions. Therefore, besides output 
distributed, several output characteristics such as number of customers and size of service 
area can influence costs. The output characteristics are included as explanatory variables to 
control for the cost differences that occur merely due to the heterogeneity of output (Caves et 
al., 1984). WU stands for the share of underground water resources used. It is included in the 
model to control for the differences in production process since groundwater usually implies 
higher drilling and pumping costs, whereas treatment costs are usually higher with surface 
water. Finally, t is a time variable which captures the shift in technology.  
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The cost function is estimated using the translog functional form which is a locally flexible 
functional form widely used in the empirical literature. The translog form of the cost function 
in (1) is specified as follows: 
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where i = 1, …, N and t = 1, …, Ti, yj (j = 1, 2, 3) stands for Q, CU and AS, while wl (l = 1, 2 
3) stands for PL, PM, and PK, respectively. Time variable t is considered to be a neutral 
technical change. Interactions of the time variable with other variables are not considered 
since insignificant coefficients were obtained.5 Normalisation of cost and input prices by one 
of the input prices is used to impose linear homogeneity in input prices. Hence, the total cost, 
the price of labour and the price of material are divided by the price of capital. The expansion 
point of the translog stochastic frontier cost function is chosen to be the sample median. 
 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is employed to estimate the cost function in (2). SFA was 
originally introduced by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck 
(1977). In subsequent papers, Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickles (1984) proposed 
stochastic frontier models for panel data. Over the years, many extensions to the originally 
proposed stochastic frontier models have been developed. A good review of different 
stochastic frontier methods is provided in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), while some new 
developments in this field can be found in Greene (2005a, b). In the stochastic frontier model 
the error term (ε it) is composed of two parts: a stochastic error (vit), capturing the effect of 
noise, and a one-sided non-negative disturbance capturing the effect of inefficiency (u
del.  
                                                
it ≥ 0). 
In estimating the frontier cost function in (2) we make use of the true fixed effects (TFE) 
model.6 In contrast to the conventional stochastic frontier methods, the newly proposed TFE 
method by Greene (2005a, b) treats firm-specific fixed effects (α i) and cost inefficiency (uit) 
separately and is therefore able to distinguish between the unobserved heterogeneity and 
inefficiency. Moreover, this relatively new method allows the inefficiency to vary over time, 
while the conventional SFA panel data methods assume time-invariant inefficiency.7  The 
TFE model is estimated by the ‘brute force’ ML, i.e., by simply creating dummy variables for 
each firm.8 It should also be noted that time-invariant firm characteristics cannot be included 
in the TFE model as explanatory variables. Nevertheless, these effects can be viewed as 
unobserved heterogeneity and are at least partly captured by the firm-specific time-invariant 
term additionally specified by this mo
 
3.2. TFP growth decomposition  
 
Following the index number approach, a TFP index is generally constructed as the ratio of an 
output index to an input index where the weights reflect the relative importance of the various 
 
5 For example, Bauer (1990) also considered a neutral technical change. 
6 Filippini et al. (2008) provide a comparison of alternative stochastic frontier models and arguments to use the 
TFE model. 
7 The remaining shortcoming of the TFE model is the incidental parameters problem (see Greene, 2005b). 
8  To estimate the stochastic cost frontier using the maximum likelihood (ML) method, the following 
distributional assumptions have to be made: ,  and v),0(iid~ 2vit Nv σ ),0(iid~ 2uit Nu σ+ it and uit are distributed 
independently of each other and of the regressors. 
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inputs and outputs (i.e., the weights equal the revenue shares and cost shares, respectively). In 
a single output case, TFP growth is defined as follows (Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967):  
 
 i
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i
ii x
C
xwyXyPFT &&&&& ∑
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1
,       (3) 
 
where a dot above a variable indicates its rate of growth over time t: 
. The observed output is denoted by y, x)/()/1(/ln dtdyydtydy ==& i is the observed use of 
i-th input (i = 1, … K), wi is the input price of i-th input, C is the observed cost, and X stands 
for an aggregate measure of an observed input usage, with weights equalling the observed 
cost shares of the inputs used.  
 
In order to decompose TFP growth, a cost-function approach combined with a differential 
method is applied.9 In addition, TFP growth is decomposed by allowing for the presence of 
cost inefficiency in the sample. Cost efficiency is given by the ratio of minimum (frontier) 
cost C(y,w,t) to observed cost C:  
 
 ,          (4) CtyCCE /),,( w=
 
where w stands for the K×1 vector of input prices. Taking the natural logarithm of both sides 
of (4), totally differentiating with respect to time and making some minor substitutions and 
rearrangements after inserting this expression in (3), Bauer (1990) showed that the observed 
TFP growth can be written as follows:10 
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where:  
=∂∂= ytyCty ln/),,(ln),,( wwyε [ ][ ]),,(//),,( tyCyytyC ww ∂∂  is the elasticity of 
cost with respect to the output; 
Si = wi xi /Ci is the observed cost share of the i-th input; 
),,(/),,(ln/),,(ln),,( tyCtyxwwtyCtyS iiii wwwx =∂∂=  is the cost-minimising cost 
share of i-th input obtained using Shephard’s (1953) lemma;  
),,( tyxi w  is the cost minimising input demand. 
 
According to (5), the TFP growth is decomposed into terms related to: (i) cost efficiency 
change; (ii) technical change; (iii) scale efficiency change; and (iv) a residual price effect term. 
The first component captures the contribution to productivity change of a change in cost 
efficiency. The second component is a technical change effect that shifts the cost frontier 
down if technological progress is present, or up if technical change is regressing. The third 
component is a scale effect which makes no contribution to productivity change if either the 
elasticity of cost with respect to the output equals one or there is no change in the output 
                                                 
9 There are two main ways to derive TFP growth decomposition, the total differential method (see, for example, 
Bauer, 1990, and Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000) and the index number method (see, for example, Caves, 
Christensen and Diewert, 1982, and Orea, 2002). Nonetheless, the two approaches result in almost identical 
formulas.  
10 Bauer (1990) extended the decomposition of TFP growth proposed in Denny, Fuss and Waverman (1981) by 
taking efficiency change over time into account.  
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produced. Output growth in the presence of scale economies (εy(y, w, t) < 1) contributes to 
productivity growth, as does an output contraction in the presence of diseconomies of scale 
(εy(y, w, t) > 1). The fourth component, the price effect term, occurs because the aggregate 
measure of input usage is biased when a firm is allocatively inefficient.11 The price effect 
term is present because TFP growth is defined as an observable quantity and therefore relies 
on observed input usage which might be biased due to cost inefficiency. Alternatively, an 
unbiased or pure measure of TFP growth could be defined by omitting the price effect term 
but the link to an observable quantity would be lost (Bauer, 1990). The TFP decomposition 
thus provides useful conceptual and empirical tools for assigning the observed changes in 
TFP to various sources. 
 
As already noted, for network industries output characteristics have an important influence on 
the cost of providing a certain output. Therefore, these characteristics are incorporated in the 
cost function and also have to be taken into the account in the TFP growth decomposition. If 
an increase in a given network characteristic increases (decreases) the cost given that the 
output remains unchanged, then increasing the level of that variable decreases (increases) TFP 
growth (Bauer, 1990). To allow for the effect of output characteristics on the TFP growth, (5) 
has to be properly modified. In our single-output case with two output characteristics, the TFP 
growth decomposition is obtained in the following way:  
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All components of the TFP growth can be obtained from the estimated cost frontier function 
in (2).  is the predicted frontier cost and CE is a cost efficiency score which is obtained 
from the estimated cost frontier function. Technical change is calculated by taking the 
derivative of estimated cost frontier function with respect to time. Further, ε
itCˆ
Q, εCU and εAS are 
elasticities of cost with respect to the output delivered (Q), number of customers (CU) and 
area size (AS), respectively. LS, MS and KS stand for the observed cost shares of labour (L), 
material (M) and capital (K), while LS*, MS* and KS* are the respective cost-minimising shares 
obtained by taking the derivative of the estimated cost frontier with respect to the price of 
labour, material and capital. Therefore, the first term on the left-hand side of (6) represents the 
cost efficiency change (CEC), the second term embodies the technical change (TC), the third 
term characterises the scale efficiency change (SEC), the fourth and fifth terms correspond to 
a change in output characteristics (OCC), while the last three terms capture the residual price 
effects (PER).  
 
4. Data 
 
The study is based on a panel data set of Slovenian water distribution utilities in the 1997-
2003 period. Some utilities also provide other services like wastewater treatment, collection 
and disposal of waste, gas distribution etc. Since 1997 public utilities have been obliged to 
prepare separate accounts for each regulated activity, which enabled us to collect the data 
related to water supply activity only. The data were gathered via a questionnaire issued by the 
Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning in 2004. In this way data on 52 water 
                                                 
11 If a firm is allocatively efficient, then Si = Si (y, w, t) and the price effect term is equal to zero. This term is 
also equal to zero when input prices change at the same rate.  
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supply utilities over the 1997-2003 period were obtained. Utilities included in the sample 
supply almost 80% of all Slovenian municipalities. The sample is an unbalanced panel 
consisting of 332 observations. As already mentioned, the data on water distribution utilities 
are not annually collected at the national level and since the Ministry of the Environment and 
Spatial Planning has not decided to repeat the survey after 2004, we were unable to collect 
more recent data. Nevertheless, as regulatory regime has remained basically unchanged over 
the years, the main conclusions also apply to the performance of water utilities up to the 
present date.  
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the stochastic cost frontier model are 
presented in Table 1, while Table 2 presents some other relevant measures for water 
distribution utilities. All input prices and costs were deflated to 2000 prices in Slovenian 
tolars (SIT) using the producers’ price index.12 The construction of input prices is described 
in more detail in Filippini et al. (2008). It can be noticed that utilities differ in size as well as 
in some environmental conditions.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the model (1997-2003) 
Variable description Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Total annual cost  
(103 EUR)  TOTEX
 1,486.1 2,625.9 35.2 14,619.9 332
Price of labour  
(EUR/ employee) PL 14,864.5 1,936.8 10,397.9 20,302.7 332
Price of capital  
(EUR/ litre per second) PK 2,191.9 2,755.2 65.8 7,237.9 332
Price of material  
(EUR/ km of network) PM 1,521.7 1,191.5 228.8 6,886.7 332
Water supplied  
(1,000 m3) Y 2,298.8 3,835.5 106.6 25,507.7 332
Number of customers 
(nr. of connections) CUST 7,402.1 7,777.4 515.0 43,272.0 332
Size of service area  
(km2) AREA 336.9 240.0 57.8 949.1 332
Share of underground 
water (%) WU 60.3 42.6 0.0 100.0 332
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 2: Selected measures of Slovenian water distribution utilities in the 1997-2003 period  
Variable description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Average cost (EUR/m3)  0.544 0.218 0.211 1.395 332
Share of water losses (%) 26.7 11.0 6.5 59.1 332
Share of household customers (%) 91.8 4.0 80.0 99.6 332
Share of water delivered to households (%) 69.3 12.2 22.9 92.7 332
Customer density 1 (customers/km2) 24.9 19.8 5.3 98.9 332
Customer density 2 (customers/km) 28.1 18.6 7.9 125.0 332
Dummy variable for heavy water treatment 
(1 – heavy treatment needed; 0 – otherwise) 0.121 0.326 0.000 1.000 332
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                                                 
12 The average official exchange rate of the Slovenian tolar (SIT) in 2000 was EUR 1 = SIT 205.0316 (Bank of 
Slovenia, 2001). 
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We can observe large differences in the average costs ranging from EUR 0.2 to EUR 1.4 per 
cubic metre of water delivered. With the exception of the share of household customers, the 
differences between utilities with respect to other selected measures are as well substantial. 
The share of household customers is found to be above 80 percent for all observations, while 
the water distributed to households varies between 23 and 93 percent. The utilities therefore 
significantly differ in the share of water delivered to non-household customers (i.e., industry 
and businesses). There are also considerable differences in customer density between the 
utilities. Water losses from the distribution network, which on average amount to 27 percent 
of total water distributed, indicate that the water systems are in quite bad shape. Most of the 
water delivered comes from underground sources which typically need less treatment but 
require higher drilling and pumping costs than surface water. Only 12 percent of utilities need 
to use chemical treatment which is necessary when the quality of water does not reach a 
predefined standard and is therefore not suitable for drinking. 
 
5. Results 
 
Estimation results of the translog cost frontier function of water distribution utilities in 
Slovenia operating between 1997 and 2003 are shown in Table 3. Using coefficient estimates 
in Table 3 and the decomposition in (6) enabled us to obtain components of the TFP growth 
(reported in Tables 4 – 6). 
 
As expected, the results in Table 3 show that input prices, output and output characteristics 
are positive and highly significant. The sum of the output coefficient (bQ) and the two 
coefficients associated with output characteristics (bCU and bAS) does not exceed 1, indicating 
the presence of economies of scale in the median-sized utility. Accordingly, a one-percent 
increase in output, number of customers and area size would lead to a 0.91-percent increase in 
total cost at the median point. Based on the negative and significant time coefficient (dT) it 
can be concluded that the total costs of Slovenian water distribution utilities have been 
decreasing over time. Statistically significant parameter λ, which is a measure of the relative 
importance of inefficiency in the overall error variance, indicates the presence of cost 
inefficiencies in the model. 
 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on the cost efficiency estimates of Slovenian water 
distribution utilities in the analysed period. The average and the median cost efficiency are 
estimated to be 84.4 and 84.7 percent, respectively, which indicates the presence of 
significant cost inefficiencies in the sample. In order to become cost efficient, water 
distribution utilities should cut their costs about 15 percent on average. The established low 
cost efficiency is largely in line with the absence of competition and with the price regulation 
scheme which is not designed in a way that stimulates water utilities to decrease their costs. 
Further, no noteworthy improvement in cost efficiency can be observed over time.  
 
The decomposition of the productivity growth of Slovenian water distribution utilities in the 
1998-2003 period is reported in Table 5. In line with the findings in Table 4, the average 
annual cost efficiency improvement in the analysed period amounted to just 0.04 percent and 
essentially did not make any contribution to the TFP growth. Further, a positive annual 
technical change of 0.92 percent on average is established implying that the costs of 
Slovenian water distribution utilities were decreasing over the examined period. Hence, the 
contribution of technical change to the TFP growth is much more pronounced in comparison 
to the efficiency change.  
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Table 3: Estimation results of the cost frontier function of Slovenian water distribution 
utilities in the 1997-2003 period 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
bPL  0.518*** 
 (0.035) 
bQ,CU -0.326 
 (0.210) 
bPM  0.189*** 
 (0.032) 
bQ,AS -0.067 
 (0.109) 
bQ  0.273*** 
 (0.079) 
bCU,AS  0.234** 
 (0.109) 
bCU  0.483*** 
 (0.083) 
bPL,Q  0.115 
 (0.100) 
bAS  0.156*** 
 (0.037) 
bPL,CU -0.078 
 (0.105) 
bPL,PL -0.185*** 
 (0.066) 
bPL,AS -0.113** 
 (0.055) 
bPM,PM -0.113** 
 (0.051) 
bPM,Q -0.178** 
 (0.077) 
bPL,PM  0.231*** 
 (0.055) 
bPM,CU  0.115 
 (0.088) 
bQ,Q  0.660*** 
 (0.172) 
bPM,AS  0.134*** 
 (0.049) 
bCU,CU -0.249 
 (0.288) 
bWU -0.037 
(0.046) 
bAS,AS  0.294*** 
 (0.093) 
bT -0.009* 
 (0.005) 
    
σv  0.1669 2/122 )( vu σσσ +=  0.3006*** 
σu  0.2499 
 
λ = σu /σv 
 
 1.497*** 
 (0.207) 
logL  162.2 N 332 
Notes: standard errors in brackets;  
* – significant at 10%, ** – significant at 5%, *** – significant at 1% 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 4: Estimated cost efficiency scores by year  
Efficiency 
score (CE) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Full 
sample 
Mean 0.847 0.837 0.846 0.845 0.839 0.844 0.846 0.844
Median 0.850 0.843 0.850 0.847 0.841 0.845 0.853 0.847
Std. Dev. 0.049 0.037 0.035 0.025 0.031 0.032 0.035 0.035
Minimum 0.673 0.729 0.720 0.769 0.764 0.730 0.752 0.673
Maximum 0.934 0.892 0.909 0.891 0.902 0.917 0.913 0.934
N 41 43 46 48 50 52 52 332
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Overall, an unimportant improvement in scale efficiency can be observed, which resulted in a 
positive annual contribution to the TFP growth of only 0.17 percent on average. However, 
there was a significant variation over the years. Changes in output characteristics appear to be 
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more stable in absolute terms and with respect to the sign, where the average annual 
contribution to the TFP growth is estimated to be –0.76 percent. The increase in output 
characteristics therefore resulted in higher total costs and a negative contribution to the TFP 
growth. With respect to the residual price effect, the average growth rate is 0.27 percent. 
Similar to the scale efficiency change, there is a significant variation in residual price effects 
in the analysed period.  
 
Table 5: TFP growth decomposition of Slovenian water distribution utilities in the 1998-2003 
period (average annual relative changes in percent)  
Nr. TFP growth component 
(in %) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Full 
sample
1 Cost efficiency change 
(CEC) -1.03 0.91 0.06 -0.64 0.57 0.27 0.04
2 Technical change 
(TC) 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
3 Scale efficiency change  
(SEC) 0.69 0.79 0.55 -2.03 -0.17 1.25 0.17
4 Change in output 
characteristics (OCC) -0.38 -0.48 -0.99 -0.27 -1.52 -0.84 -0.76
5 Residual price effect 
(PER) 2.69 -1.40 0.04 0.43 1.79 -1.67 0.27
6 TFP growth (TFPC)  
(=1+2+3+4+5) 2.89 0.74 0.58 -1.58 1.59 -0.06 0.64
7 Pure TFP growth (without 
PER) (=6 – 5) 0.21 2.14 0.54 -2.01 -0.20 1.61 0.37
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Putting all the effects together, TFP growth is obtained which is found to be slightly 
increasing over the examined period, where average annual growth of 0.64 percent is 
estimated. If we observe pure TFP growth, i.e. without the residual price effects, we obtain a 
relatively disappointing result as the annual TFP growth is found to be very close to zero, 
amounting to just 0.37 percent on average. The results are not at all surprising and are 
consistent with the non-competitive environment in which public utilities operated and with 
the absence of proper regulatory incentives that would have stimulated utilities to operate in a 
more efficient way. 
 
Similar studies in the case of water and sewerage companies from England and Wales reveal 
somewhat higher TFP growth rates. However, their performance slightly worsened, albeit not 
statistically significantly, after privatisation. Using an index number approach, Saal and 
Parker (2001) estimated a decrease in TFP growth from 2.3 percent in the 1985-1990 period 
to 1.6 percent in the 1990-1999 period. Further, in Saal et al. (2007) TFP growth is 
decomposed using stochastic frontier methods. Again, it is established that performance in 
terms of TFP growth in pre-transition period (1.75 percent) slightly outperformed the 
performance in the post-transition period (1.64 percent). The technical change did increase 
after privatisation, while efficiency levels slightly worsened. Scale effects also made a 
negative contribution to the TFP growth, implying that companies are characterised by 
decreasing returns to scale. The better performance of the UK water and sewerage companies 
compared to the Slovenian water distribution utilities can most likely be attributed to the 
RPI+K price cap regulation in the UK that was designed to encourage an efficiency catch up.  
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Table 6 presents the cumulative growth of TFP components in the Slovenian water sector in 
the analysed period. Efficiency improvements did not contribute to the TFP growth as the 
average cost efficiency levels essentially remained the same over the examined period. 
Technical change resulted in a 5.7 percent increase in the productivity of the water industry, 
which can be seen as a more promising finding. Further, positive scale and residual price 
effects in the analysed period are largely offset by the negative effect of a change in output 
characteristics. Altogether, the TFP increased by roughly 4 percent in 2003 relative to 1997, 
while the increase in pure TFP was only 2 percent.  
 
Table 6: Cumulative average TFP of Slovenian water distribution utilities in the 1997-2003 
period (1997 = 100)  
Nr. TFP growth components 
(1997 = 100) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1 Cost efficiency change 
(CEC) 100 99.0 99.9 99.9 99.3 99.9 100.1
2 Technical change  
(TC) 100 100.9 101.9 102.8 103.7 104.7 105.7
3 Scale efficiency change 
(SEC) 100 100.7 101.5 102.0 100.0 99.8 101.1
4 Change in output 
characteristics (OCC) 100 99.6 99.1 98.2 97.9 96.4 95.6
5 Residual price effect 
(PER) 100 102.7 101.3 101.3 101.7 103.6 101.8
6 TFP growth  
(TFPC) 100 102.9 103.7 104.3 102.6 104.2 104.2
7 Pure TFP growth (without 
PER) 100 100.2 102.4 102.9 100.8 100.6 102.3
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Based on the results it may be concluded that the productivity improvement of the Slovenian 
water distribution utilities over the observed period was quite poor. The main reason can be 
found in the regulatory framework which was very administrative in nature and primarily 
designed to control price increases. Productivity improvements were not the primary objective 
of the price regulation and no incentives were in place to promote the more efficient operation 
and performance of water utilities. The results could also be partly influenced by investments 
companies had to make in order to meet water and environmental standards. However, due to 
a lack of funds the investments were not substantial and were mostly postponed to the future. 
Therefore, the latter effect cannot be seen as the key reason for the low productivity growth of 
the Slovenian water industry.  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
In the paper we find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the lack of proper incentives to 
improve performance has resulted in the low TFP growth of Slovenian water distribution 
utilities. Cost efficiency estimates indicate that considerable inefficiencies are present in the 
water distribution utilities. In addition, no improvement in cost efficiency over the observed 
time period is detected. Nevertheless, the costs of water utilities were slightly decreasing over 
time, which is a result of a positive technical change. Overall, the productivity improvement 
of Slovenian water distribution utilities in the analysed period is relatively disappointing. 
Apparently, the current institutional and regulatory setting of the Slovenian water industry 
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does not provide sufficient incentives for water utilities to make productivity improvements. 
Therefore, the first step towards a good practice in regulation would be to create an 
autonomous and professional regulatory agency to regulate water prices. The proposed 
alternative would in a large part replace, rather than complement, the current regulatory 
practice. Higher productivity could be achieved by launching incentive-based price-cap 
regulation combined with benchmarking which would aim at improving the performance of 
water utilities. Such a scheme has already been implemented in the energy sector in many EU 
member states, including Slovenia. Thus, this could serve as an example of a good practice 
regulation for the water sector or, more broadly, the communal sector as well. A possible 
limitation of this study may be found in the fact that it refers to the supply of drinking water 
only, while some utilities also provide other services like wastewater treatment, waste 
collection and waste disposal. Nonetheless, since data on other activities is unavailable it was 
impossible to study the multi-product cost function and the presence of economies of scope. 
The performance of multi-utility companies is therefore left to be investigated in the future 
research.  
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Rast produktivnosti i cjenovna regulacija vodoopskrbnih poduzeća u Sloveniji 
 
Sažetak 
 
Glavni cilj rada je analizirati metodu cjenovne regulacije i produktivnost vodoopskrbne 
djelatnosti u Sloveniji. Postavljena je hipoteza, da je pomanjkanje inicijativa za poboljšanje 
uspješnosti rezultiralo u niskoj rasti ukupne faktorske produktivnosti vodoopskrbnih poduzeća 
u Sloveniji. Na osnovu primjenjene metode stohastičke granice (SFA metode) izvedena je 
dekompozicija rasti ukupne faktorske produktivnosti (TFP) slovenskih poduzeća za 
distribuciju pitke vode u razdoblju 1997-2003. Rezultati istraživanja potvrđuju prisutnost 
neučinkovitosti poduzeća u vodoopskrbi, što naznačuje na potencial za značajno sniženje 
troškova u analiziranoj djelatnosti. Dok se neučinkovitost u analiziranom razdoblju nije 
poboljšala, utvrđen je značajan i pozitivan doprinos tehničkog napredka ka rasti ukupne 
faktorske produktivnosti. U cijelini ocjenjena rast ukupne faktorske produktivnosti je 
pozitivna ali blizu nule, što je prilično slab rezultat. Dobijeni rezultati mogu se pripisati 
sadašnjem institucionalnom i regulatornom okviru koji ne stimuliše vodoopskrbna poduzeća 
za poboljšanje produktivnosti. Prema tome potrebno bi bilo ozbiljno razmisliti o formiranju 
autonomne regulatorne agencije i uvođenju metoda regulacije koje bi imale ugrađene 
iniciative za poboljšanje uspješnosti vodoopskrbnih poduzeća u Sloveniji. 
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